

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #2155/01 3182356
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 142356Z NOV 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0752
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0883
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0175
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0192
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0461
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1297
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0131
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1064
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0912
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1530
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0694
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0992
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8231
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 002155

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [IN](#) [NP](#) [UNSC](#)
SUBJECT: NEPALESE PERMREP TO FORMALLY ASK FOR UN
ASSISTANCE/ARMS MONITORING

REF: A. KATHMANDU 3023

[1](#)B. KATHMANDU 3034

Classified By: DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ALEX WOLFF, FOR REASONS
1.4 B/D

[1](#)1. (C) Summary and comment: DPR Wolff met November 13 with Indian DPR Malhotra and November 14 with Nepalese PermRep Acharya to discuss the Nepalese request for UN assistance in implementing the November 8 peace deal between the government of Nepal and the Maoists. Malhotra and Acharya confirmed that their governments would not object to a UNSC resolution authorizing assistance, even if they preferred a Presidential letter or PRST, but tied their support to rapid Council action in support of the peace deal. Amb. Wolff pressed Acharya to send a letter to the Secretary-General that informs him of the November 8 deal and requests UN assistance. Acharya said he planned to do so quickly. Following receipt of the letter, the Secretary-General is expected to share the letter with the Security Council. Consideration of the matter will likely occur quickly. USUN, the Indian Mission and the Nepalese Mission have all queried UNSC members, and do not expect any significant objections to an UNSCR addressing a potential UN role in arms monitoring, provided that the government of Nepal clearly supports the request. End summary and comment.

[1](#)2. (C) Indian DPR Malhotra told Amb. Wolff on November 13 that India would support SC action authorizing assistance in support of the Government of Nepal,s peace deal with the Maoists, as long as the UN involvement is limited to arms management. He added that speed was of the essence, indicating that the form of the SC authorization was secondary. Malhotra urged that some initial monitoring presence be put in place before November 21, possibly as an advance or a preliminary assessment team. Amb. Wolff said the Security Council would likely react quickly, as long as the Nepalese government sent a letter noting the November 8 peace deal and requesting UN support in its implementation. Wolff also queried Malhotra regarding Indian PermRep Sen,s

recent conversation with Amb. Bolton, when Sen said the Maoists might be wary of an UNSCR. Malhotra said he doubted this was the case. (Comment: It appears there has been an evolution in the position of the Indian government, which now could accept a UNSCR, even if they would prefer something less. End comment.)

¶3. (C) On November 14, Nepalese PermRep Acharya called on Amb. Wolff to discuss UN action in response to the peace agreement. Acharya confirmed that he was preparing a letter to send to the UN Secretary-General noting the November 8 agreement and requesting UN assistance in its support of its implementation. He planned to send that letter November 14. Nepal would support "anything that comes before the Security Council," said Acharya, as long as the Council authorized a clearly defined mission and acted quickly. Amb. Wolff explained that an UNSCR would set the UN's activities in Nepal on a more solid footing.

¶4. (C) Acharya said Nepal did not have a preference over which UN department (the Department of Political Affairs or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations) took the lead on the mission, although he noted that both the government and the Maoists would prefer that the UN personnel be called monitors or observers and not "peacekeepers," and perform their duties in civilian attire. (Comment: USUN is scheduled to meet with DPA and DPKO November 15 to explore further the UN's view of assistance.) Although he understood that setting up a robust arms monitoring mission would require planning and mobilization, Acharya pushed for a speedy process. He also suggested that a preliminary press statement by the Security Council that welcomed the peace deal and noted Council consideration of the matter would help sustain the momentum of the peace process.

BOLTON